The growing Brics divide between carbon nations and electrostates - FT中文网
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The growing Brics divide between carbon nations and electrostates

Energy systems can shape political institutions and make some nations more vulnerable to trade wars than others
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{"text":[[{"start":9.04,"text":"The writer is assistant professor of sociology and international affairs at Princeton University and author of ‘Urban Power: Democracy and Inequality in São Paulo and Johannesburg’"}],[{"start":21.58,"text":"When leaders convened in Rio de Janeiro for the 2025 Brics summit, the bloc projected confidence: freshly expanded to 11 member states, it issued a 31-page declaration and renewed calls to reduce dollar dependency. But beneath this choreography of multi-polar ambition lies a structural divide that will determine how much strategic autonomy Brics countries can exercise."}],[{"start":48.72,"text":"That divide is not ideological but infrastructural. There is a growing split between electrostates (those building industrial capacity for clean energy technologies) and carbon states (those whose economic and political institutions remain deeply tied to fossil fuels). Energy systems both reflect and mobilise the political coalitions that govern national economies, and these coalitions shape national capacity to resist external economic coercion amid deepening global fragmentation."}],[{"start":85.37,"text":"Electrostates control key nodes in emerging green supply chains, while carbon states remain exposed to fossil-fuel market volatility and climate-linked trade restrictions such as the EU’s carbon border tax."}],[{"start":100.65,"text":"China, in the first category, is building industrial capacity around electric vehicles, renewable energy, battery supply chains and green technology exports; it is now building three-quarters of the world’s solar and wind power. By contrast, carbon states such as Russia remain tightly bound to hydrocarbon rents and fossil-fuel exports. Their economic power relies on carbon-intensive trade flows, which limits flexibility and locks in established elite coalitions. "}],[{"start":133.85000000000002,"text":"South Africa straddles this divide, and is therefore vulnerable. Its energy matrix remains overwhelmingly coal-based, its automotive sector is still almost exclusively built around internal combustion engine vehicles and it is deeply tied to US markets. ICE cars are among South Africa’s largest exports to America, and the vast majority of its trade remains dollar-denominated."}],[{"start":161.93,"text":"These structural realities limit its capacity to resist external economic pressure. Recently, it has been positioned as a flagship case for new forms of climate finance. Its $12.8bn Just Energy Transition Partnership, launched in 2021 with western backing, was intended to support a shift from coal to clean energy. But it has largely reinforced donor priorities around coal decommissioning, and its loan-heavy model has deepened fiscal constraints."}],[{"start":194.61,"text":"More importantly, the JETP is a source of escalating political conflict, pitting coal power brokers and labour unions against emerging green capital and state reformers in a country where state-owned enterprises, regulatory systems and political networks were built around coal dependence. The country’s geopolitical vulnerability became clear in May, when President Cyril Ramaphosa visited the Oval Office. There, Donald Trump warned of new tariffs on South African vehicle exports. A White House letter this month reiterated this threat, outlining tariffs of 30 per cent. South Africa has little room to manoeuvre."}],[{"start":237.45000000000002,"text":"By contrast, Brazil, with nearly 90 per cent of its electricity coming from renewable sources, is nimbly repositioning itself. It has attracted major green industrial investment from Chinese companies, including BYD’s EV manufacturing complex in Bahia. Brazil’s development banks are experimenting with green finance instruments and non-dollar trade settlement mechanisms, preparing for greater economic sovereignty. This approach is not without risk: Trump has announced a 50 per cent tariff on Brazilian imports. But Brazil’s energy dynamics allow it to pivot to other electrostates like China, already its largest trading partner."}],[{"start":282.59000000000003,"text":"Some Brics members, including China, Brazil and India, are also co-ordinating on green technology standards, investment platforms and infrastructure interoperability, suggesting a potential foundation for a co-operative industrial strategy rooted in clean energy. But the group struggles to act as a unified force on the global stage due to divergent energy pathways. Many members still depend on western markets, and few have the industrial foundations and political coalitions to pursue real autonomy."}],[{"start":319.87,"text":"At a time when economic coercion has become central to US foreign policy, countries with green industrial bases and supportive domestic political coalitions are more resilient to such pressure. Those locked into fossil-dependent infrastructures remain vulnerable."}],[{"start":338.42,"text":"In a world shaped by geopolitical rivalry, the Brics’ strategic autonomy will rise and fall on the capacity of member states to mobilise the coalitions necessary for a turn away from fossil fuels."}],[{"start":360.75000000000006,"text":""}]],"url":"https://audio.ftmailbox.cn/album/a_1753235508_2022.mp3"}

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