{"text":[[{"start":5.55,"text":"Sam Altman’s argument in these pages that it is time for a “global framework” for AI reflects a stark reality. The technology he and his peers are creating has enormous destructive potential that spills beyond national borders. He is also right that the world has faced such challenges before. This new one, though, is harder to fix."}],[{"start":26.55,"text":"Altman’s idea sounds a lot like the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, applied to AI. He suggests a global forum of policymakers and experts that would set standards for AI models, watch to make sure the profit motive doesn’t trump safety, and grant compliant countries access to advanced technologies. As with Basel, enforcement and actual rule-setting would be done by individual countries, to avoid seeming undemocratic."}],[{"start":53.25,"text":"This might sound like a bratwurst crying out for a July 4 barbecue. After all, AI lobbyists have argued furiously, when confronted with US state-level legislation, that red tape chills innovation. In finance, too, banks grumble loudly about Basel, which lumbers them with huge compliance costs and can appear unduly fraught with complexity. "}],[{"start":74.8,"text":"But international bank oversight has had unintended consequences that, if applied to the AI space, might not be half bad for Altman and his peers. For one, it has entrenched the largest lenders. Onerous regulation favours those with budgets large enough to navigate it. And to the extent that the oversight body is US-led, as Altman suggests it should be, US interests will inevitably dominate. "}],[{"start":99.15,"text":"Another fly in the ointment: China. To be genuinely effective, a global alliance would have to include the People’s Republic — as Basel and the International Atomic Energy Agency both do. It’s hard to see Beijing agreeing to brakes on its technological progress. A global accord could therefore turn into an iron curtain with China on the other side — an idea that may appeal to western AI firms worried their customers will opt for cheap Chinese rivals such as DeepSeek."}],[{"start":127.60000000000001,"text":"Basel demonstrates two other problems with global oversight. First, crises are easier to spot in hindsight, even by experts. Basel’s priorities and prescriptions have at various times amplified rather than fixed weaknesses in the system, while focusing on the wrong risks. How that might play out in AI is hard to know. Common standards could lead to shared points of failure, or lead everyone to overlook the same vulnerabilities."}],[{"start":154.15,"text":"Second, Basel took a long time to get going, and when it comes to AI risk, time is in short supply. The committee was set up in 1974, but it wasn’t until 1988 that it first settled on rules regarding bank capital. The IAEA took almost four years to create from when US President Dwight Eisenhower called for an international body to address nuclear threats. Altman thinks systems with “astonishing power” are just a year or two away."}],[{"start":184.3,"text":"The OpenAI chief is right to warn that if global collaboration doesn’t happen, fragmentation will. Countries will impose barriers of their own; these will almost certainly prove ineffective at keeping out bad actors and dangerous technologies. But a US-led world order would hand a huge advantage to an American oligopoly that includes his own company. In a world of unenviable choices, the latter is as good as it gets."}],[{"start":218.60000000000002,"text":""}]],"url":"https://audio.ftcn.net.cn/album/a_1783044032_5705.mp3"}